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PROTECTING HIV CONFIDENTIALITY AFTER URBANIAK V.
NEWTON: WILL CALIFORNIA'S CONSTITUTION PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
INTRODUCTION

The United States has been hit hard by the AIDS epidemic. 1 Current

figures estimate that over 200,000 Americans have developed AIDS2 and
over one million are believed to be HIV-infected.' By March 1991, over
105,000 Americans had died from AIDS with up to 215,000 more deaths
expected by the end of 1993.
HIV-positive persons, those who are HIV-infected, face almost certain
death and are often confronted with prejudice and discrimination.' HIV

1. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) results from infection with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). HIV can be passed to another person through certain body
fluids, such as blood and semen. Persons with HIV may have no outward signs of illness, but
still be capable of transmitting the virus. HIV infection refers to all persons with the virus,
while AIDS refers to those in the final stage of infection who have specific illnesses and
conditions. SHARON RENNERT, AIDS/HIV AND CONFIDENIALITY, MODEL POLICY AND
PROCEDURES 1 (A.B.A. 1991).
"A World Health Organization official estimates that 11-13 million people globally have
been infected since the beginning of the epidemic and that a new infection occurs every 15
seconds." Amsterdam Hosts Conference, AIDS UPDATE (Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.) Oct. 1992, at 11 [hereinafter Amsterdam Conference]. Some
international experts believe as many as 110 million people worldwide will be infected with HIV
by the year 2000. Id.
2. According to the World Health Organization, as of July 1, 1992, 218,301 AIDS cases
had been reported in the United States, up from 213,641 on April 1, 1992. World AIDS Cases
Total 500,000; True Figure Said Far in Excess, AIDS POLICY & LAW, July 10, 1992, at 8.
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), "[a]pproximately 58,000 persons were diagnosed with AIDS in the United States during 1991." During the
period 1992-1994, the number of persons newly diagnosed with AIDS is expected to reach
approximately 60,000-70,000 per year. Projections of the Number of PersonsDiagnosed With
AIDS and the Number of lmmunosuppressed H1V-Infected Persons-UnitedStates, 1992-1994,
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT-RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS, Dec. 25,
1992, at 1.
3. THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 268 (John W. Wright ed., 1992).
4. Id. "Researchers at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) project that 165,000 to
215,000 more Americans will die of AIDS by the end of 1993. Yet this devastating disease was
unknown until 1981." Id.
5. ROBERTA COHEN & LAURIE S. WISEBERG, DOUBLE JEOPARDY-THREAT TO LIFE AND

HUMAN RIGHTS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH AIDS 3 (Human Rights Internet,
March 1990) "Persons with HIV/AIDS face double jeopardy: they face death, and while they
are fighting for their lives, they often face discrimination." Id. "Although HIV can remain in
the body for years before any visible symptoms show up, once AIDS develops, the patient has
no chance to survive. The virus disables the immune system, leaving the body vulnerable to
almost any infection, frequently pneumonia and tuberculosis . . . AIDS patients suffer a
protracted period of illness and disease before death." Id. at 4.
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infection can lead to discrimination in medical treatment,6 housing,7
employment,8 education, 9 travel, 10 and insurance." Women12 and chil-

6. In New York City, 1988, an HIV-positive young man in critical need of dialysis could
not get treatment because several hospitals wrongly believed he would contaminate their dialysis
units. Id. at 12. In December 1991, the Los Angeles Times reported that AIDS bias is greater
among doctors who practice in communities of color. Policy Briefs, AIDS UPDATE (Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), May 1992, at 38 [hereinafter
Policy Briefs]. In March 1992, the New York Newsday reported that a Baltimore drug suspect
was denied medical attention after he told police he was HIV-infected. Id.
7. A 1988 survey by the Harvard School of Public Health (covering 1983-1988) found 40%
of Americans were opposed to housing AIDS patients in their neighborhoods. COHEN &
WISEBERG, supra note 5, at 23. In 1989, it was estimated over 8,000 people with AIDS were
homeless in New YorkCity. Id. at 23. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1989 prohibits
discrimination against people with HIV and AIDS in the sale or rental of private housing. This
Act should afford greater protection to persons with AIDS. Id. at 23.
8. The 1988 Report of a Presidential Commission on AIDS confirmed that barriers and
prejudices against HIV-infected persons in the workplace are common. Id. at 25. Although the
Supreme Court ruling in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), extended
the protection of laws barring discrimination against handicapped persons (The Federal
Rehabilitation Act of 1973) to include persons with AIDS, discrimination continues. COHEN &
WISEBERG, supra note 5, at 26.
In February 1992, the American Journal of Public Health reported that many Americans
are still wary of working with someone infected with HIV. Policy Briefs, supra note 6, at 38.
In July 1992, a woman filed suit in San Bernardino against her employer, a medical laboratory,
charging she was fired shortly after an office sponsored blood test revealed she was HIV
positive. John L. Mitchell, Suit Alleges Firing of HIV Positive Woman, L.A. TIMES, July 22,
1992, at A3.
The American With Disabilities Act (ADA) employment section went into effect July 26,
1992. The ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with HIV infection or AIDS in public
accommodations, employment (public and private), transportation, state and local government
services, and telecommunications. A significant increase in litigation is expected. Employment
Section of ADA Taking Effect; A Wide Range of Litigation Is Foreseen, AIDS POUCY & LAW
supra note 2, at 1.
9. Polls show that Americans have become more tolerant toward HIV-infected children in
school. A survey by the Harvard School of Public Health found, compared to 39% in 1985, in
1988 only 18% believed infected children should be prohibited from attending school. While
this figure is encouraging, it does indicate that prejudice still continues. COHEN & WISEBERO,
supra note 5, at 28.
10. HIV-positive foreigners seeking temporary' or permanent residency are denied entry into
the United States. Id. at 37. Over 55 countries have imposed restrictions on travelers with HIV
infection or AIDS. Id. at 36. A March 1992 State Department cable informed American
consulates that due to the high cost of treatment, HIV-infected aliens are more likely to be
subjected to the public charge provision and denied access to the United States because of the
high cost of treatment. Policy Briefs, supra note 6, at 38.
11. In the United States more and more health insurance companies are denying coverage
to HIV-positive persons or are charging them prohibitive premiums. A 1988 Congressional
study on "AIDS and Health Insurance" found that 86% of U.S. health insurance companies tried
to screen applicants for the HIV virus. "On January 1, 1990, the George Washington University
Health Plan limited coverage to $3,000 a year under the plan which includes AIDS patients."
COHEN & WISEBERG, supra note 5, at 38-39.
12. Women who contract AIDS are often subjected to physical abuse by their partners,
denied medical assistance, and rejected by their family and friends. Id. at 30. Two out of three
cases of HIV infection have been in men. However, since the beginning of 1992, nearly onehalf of all new infections among adults have been in women. By the year 2000, women are
exp ted to lead men in the rate of new infections. Amsterdam Conference, supra note 1,at 11.
While HIV-positive women have a similar disease pattern to HIV-positive men, they are less
likely to be offered standard HIV-related treatments. Id. at 14.
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dren 13 are particularly vulnerable.
Confidentiality of HIV status is a primary concern of infected individuals
who seek to minimize discrimination and maintain a reasonable quality of
life."' There is also a strong public interest in protecting confidentiality in
order to encourage individuals to seek and to receive treatment. 5 Another
compelling reason for protecting confidentiality is to encourage HIV-positive
individuals to disclose their status when another person's safety is at risk. 6
In response to the public interest in encouraging HIV-infected individuals
to seek treatment, the California Legislature passed Chapter 1.11 of the
Health & Safety Code in 1985.1 Chapter 1.11 section 199.21 provides for
civil and criminal liability for wrongful disclosure of AIDS test results. 8
Section 199.21 subdivision (a) provides up to a one thousand dollar penalty
for negligent disclosure.' 9 Other sections of 199.21 cover willful disclosures, 20 criminal sanctions, 21 and damages liability.' As enacted in 1985
and amended in 1991, Chapter 1.11 appeared to be a comprehensive HIV

13. Many children born with AIDS are abandoned and placed in institutions where they
receive little love and attention. They are born into poverty and their families can not afford
treatment. Many HIV-infected children do not receive a proper education due to discrimination
and to retarded mental or motor skills. Eighty percent of children with AIDS risk severe
damage of the central nervous system. COHEN & WISEBERG, supra note 5, at 29. In 1988,
3,000 children were born with HIV in the United States. Id. at 29. At the VIII International
Conference on AIDS (held in Amsterdam July 19-24, 1992) a clinician from the National
Institutes of Health reported "AIDS is quickly becoming a leading cause of childhood death in
the United States." Amsterdam Conference, supra note 1, at 11.
14. RENNERT, supra note 1, at I.
15. A.B.A., Report of the Aids Committee, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 9, 36 (1989).
16. Jeff Glenney, Aids: A Crisis In Confidentiality, 62 S.CAL. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (1989).
"Mhe most probable means of transmission (other than sexual contact or use of an infected IV
needle) is contact between an AIDS patient and a health care worker." Id. at 1707.
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 199.20-199.29 (Deering & Supp. 1992). 199.20
states the purpose of the code: "To protect the privacy of individuals who are the subject of
blood testing for antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS). . ." Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Health & Safety Code.
18. Id. § 199.21.
19. Id. § 199.21(a). Section 1991.21(a) provides: "Any person who negligently discloses
results of an HIV test.., to any third party... shall be assessed a civil penalty in an amount
not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000)..."
20. Id. § 199.21(b). Section 199.21(b) provides: "Any person who willfully discloses the
results of an HIV test... to any third party ... shall be assessed a civil penalty in an amount
not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than five thousand ($5,000). .."
21. Id. § 199.21(c). Section 199.21(c) provides: "Any person who willfully or negligently
discloses the results of an HIV test. . . which results in economic, bodily, or psychological
harm to the subject of the test, is guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail for a period not to exceed one year or a fine of not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000).22. Id. § 199.21(d). 199.21(d) provides: "Any person who commits any act described in
subdivision (a) or (b) shall be liable to the subject for all actual damages, including damages for
economic, bodily, or psychological harm which is a proximate result of the act."
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confidentiality statute.'
In 1991, the First District Court of Appeal in Urbaniak v. Newton, 4
narrowly construed section 199.21 to apply only to disclosures by persons
having access to the actual record of the results of a blood test.' Although
the court recognized a public interest in voluntary disclosure to health care
workers,' the court refused to apply 199.21 in situations where a patient
voluntarily discloses his or her HIV status in order to warn a health care
worker to take safety precautions.'
In order to satisfy the public's interest in voluntary disclosure, the court
held disclosure of HIV-positive status, or the fact an individual is HIVinfected, "may under appropriate circumstances" be entitled to protection
under article I, section 1, of the California Constitution.'
The court
severely limited the scope of the statute, but at the same time provided
apparently broad constitutional protection. The question remains whether the
constitutional "right to privacy" action will actually ensure confidentiality
and satisfy the public interest in encouraging HIV-positive individuals to
disclose their status for the protection of others. 9
This Note begins with a discussion of the Urbaniakdecision interpreting
section 199.21, including the court's policy reasons for its narrow construction of the statute. Part II investigates the broad right to privacy protection
now available under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. Part
Im proposes that, despite Urbaniak'sprovision for broad privacy protection,
the court's decision may be insufficient to ensure confidentiality and
encourage voluntary disclosure when safety precautions are needed. The

23. Section 199.21 has often been cited as providing broad protection for privacy rights in
HIV status.
Privacy rights are protected by medical confidentiality laws such as CAL. HEALTH &
SAFEY CODE § 199.21(c). A.B.A., AIDS THE LEGAL ISSUES 103 (1988).
"The level of protection of confidentiality of HIV-related medical records varies from state
to state. California is representative of those states that have provided broad protection to HIVrelated records." ROBERT M. JARvIS Er AL., AIDS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 164 (1991).
"Mhe California statutes are quite broad. They provide for civil sanctions up to $1,000
plus court costs for the negligent disclosure of the identity of a person who has AIDS."
Glenney, supra note 16, at 1724.
"California has been in the forefront of legislation on AIDS since 1985. Current state law
has extensive provisions governing consent, confidentiality, and release of patient-specific
information regarding HIV antibody testing." Mark. A. Kadzielski, Califomia Legislation of
AIDS in the Health Care Setting, 10 WHITrIER L. REV. 363, 363 (1988).
24. 277 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1991).
25. Id. at 362.
26. Id. at 360.
27. Id. at 362.
28. Id. at 360.
29. Glenney, supra note 16, at 1728. Glenney advocates legislation which will protect the
identities of AIDS patients but will also address the goal of protecting uninfected health care
workers. Id. at 1702. "Augmenting the tort law to protect the confidentiality of HIV carriers
would likely deter all dissemination of this information. In order for the information to be used,
legislative exceptions must exist to allow the flow of this information where necessary." Id. at
1728.
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Note concludes with recommendations for clear statutory protection.
I. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF SECTION

199.21

A. Facts and Background
In September 1984, Richard Urbaniak suffered a head injury while
working as a machine operator in San Francisco.' The injury produced
disabling head and back pain which prevented him from working."
Urbaniak brought a workers' compensation action in mid-1985 against his
former employer, complaining of headaches, shoulder pain, mid-back pain,
and numbness and tingling in the fingers of his right hand.32
The employer's insurance carrier, Allianz Insurance Company, hired the
law firm of John J. Parente to defend the action. 3 In February 1986 an
associate in Parente's firm made arrangements through Urbaniak's counsel
for a neurological examination by Dr. Frederic H. Newton.' The examination required that Dr. Newton fasten reusable metal electrodes with sharp
points to Urbaniak's body.35
Urbaniak was concerned that traces of blood on the electrodes could
After requesting confidentiality, he told Dr.
infect another person.'
Newton's nurse he was HIV-positive so she could take precautions and
carefully sterilize the reusable probes.37 Although Urbaniak insisted he
never talked directly to the doctor about his HIV status,3" Dr. Newton's
examination report mentioned Urbaniak's HIV status as a possible source of
muscle tension which could account for his symptoms. 3 9 Dr. Newton sent
one copy of the report to Parente which forwarded copies to Urbaniak's
counsel and to Allianz Insurance, where at least seven employees had access
to it.' Copies also went to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and
Urbaniak's chiropractor."
In his lawsuit against Dr. Newton, Urbaniak maintained the dissemination of the medical report disclosing his HIV status was a violation of Health

30. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Urbaniak reported his conversation with Dr. Newton's nurse was a very brief one,
to tell her that he didn't want his HIV status put on his report and she needed to be careful
sterilizing the equipment. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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and Safety Code section 199.21.42 Urbaniak argued the statute should be
broadly construed to cover disclosures orally received from an HIV-infected
individual.'
B. The Court's Construction of Section 199.21
The Urbaniakcourt held the statutory language "appears to apply only
to disclosures by persons having access to the record of the results of a blood
test."'
The court conceded the legislative history called for a broad
interpretation, but observed Urbaniak's "interpretation would give the statute
an extraordinarily long reach, affecting the transmittal of information about
AIDS victims in a wide variety of social 45
contexts. This sweeping scope is
not supported by the statutory language."
The court found liability was limited to any person who "discloses
results of a blood test."' The court noted section 199.21, subdivision (k)
defines "disclosed" as the "release [of] . . . any part of any record orally,
[or] in writing . . . to any person or entity.47 The 4court determined

"record" could "only refer to the record of a blood test."

C. Rationalefor the Court's Construction
The Urbaniak court limited the scope of 199.21 based on its narrow
definition of the word "record" and its interpretation of the statute's urgency
provision.49 In this urgency provision, the legislature explained 199.21 was
intended to protect the confidentiality of persons undergoing a blood test for
HIV infection and to encourage them to undergo treatment." The Urbaniak
court found the legislative purpose would be served "only to the extent that
the statute is applied to persons and institutions that conduct tests for AIDS,
assume responsibility for custody or distribution of test results, or use test
results in connection with [the] treatment of [an] affected person. " "
The facts in Urbaniak indicate Urbaniak's HIV status was used in

42. Id. at 355.
43. Id.at 362.
44. Id. Note: the Urbaniak decision occurred prior to the 1991 amendment to section
199.21. However, the amendment did not change the civil and criminal liability for wrongful
disclosure of HIV test results. The amendment changed the definition of an HIV test. An
"HIV test" is now defined as "any clinical test, laboratory or otherwise, used to identify HIV,
a component of HIV, or antibodies or antigens to HIV." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
199.21 (Deering 1992) and § 26(e) (Deering 1993).
45. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
46. Id.
47. Id. (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 1985 CAL. STAT. ch. 22, § 4, at 83.
51. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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connection with treatment. The insurance company used Dr. Newton's
report to terminate payments to Urbaniak's chiropractor. 2 Termination of
payments can have a significant impact on medical treatment. Using a
similar analysis, the court could have found Dr. Newton's examination was
made in connection with Urbaniak's treatment, applied section 199.21 to the
situation, and determined Dr. Newton negligently disclosed the information.'
Although the Urbaniak court identified a public interest favoring the
communication of HIV-positive status in order to warn a health care worker
to take safety precautions,' the court stated it wanted to avoid a broad
interpretation of section 199.21.1 5 Simply addressing the narrow question
presented by Urbaniakwould have satisfied the public interest and accomplished the court's goal.' The court could have considered only disclosures
made to health care workers in order to encourage them to take safety
precautions. Answering this narrow question and applying section 199.21
would not have required a broad construction of the statute.57
The court's rationale for denying a remedy under section 199.21 was to
avoid giving the statute a broad interpretation which would apply in a wide
variety of social situations. Instead, the court granted Urbaniak a right to
privacy action in his HIV status. Thus, the court may have actually provided
even broader protection than Urbaniak had expected from the statute.58
II.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN

HIV STATUS

The Urbaniakcourt found HIV status was entitled to privacy protection
under the California Constitution under certain circumstances. 9 These
circumstances involve "improper use of information properly obtained" when

52. Id. at 356.
53. The court in justifying the right to privacy alluded to Dr. Newton's negligence. "The
allegations of the complaint support the inference that Dr. Newton knew of and ratified the use
of the information confided to his nurse. The offending information had limited relevance to
the medical examination. It would have been possible to mention the patient's concern over his
health as a source of stress without specifically mentioning his HIV-positive status." Id. at 361.
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id. at 362.
56. California Medical Association, Petition for Decertification in Urbaniak v. Newton,
March 14, 1991, at 8 [decertification denied] [hereinafter CMA Petition] (on file with the
California Western Law Review).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 13. "IThe Court of Appeal's application of the constitutional right of privacy will
create even greater problems than those the court feared would result from a "sweeping"
interpretation of 199.21 The constitutional right is virtually boundless." Id.
59. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 360. "There can be no doubt that disclosure of HIV
positive status may under appropriate circumstances be entitled to protection under article 1,
section 1." Id.
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the patient had reasonable expectations of privacy.' Urbaniak was entitled
to protection since he had reasonably anticipated privacy when he disclosed
his status to Dr. Newton's nurse."'
A. California'sConstitutionalRight to Privacy
The Urbaniakcourt arrived at its decision by first reviewing the history
of California's right to privacy. Article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution was amended in 1972 to include "privacy" among every
citizen's inalienable rights.62
One of the first cases to consider a violation of the state constitutional
right to privacy was White v. Davis.' In White, police officers posed as
students to engage in a covert operation of recording class discussions at the
University of California.' The California Supreme Court found the police
activity constituted a prima facie violation of the students' and professors'
right to privacy.'
As the Court pointed out, the privacy amendment
created a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian which
could only be infringed by a compelling public need or government
interest.'
The California Supreme Court suggested a compelling government
interest might pertain to the investigation of "illegal activity or acts." 67 The
Court also cited County of Nevada v. MacMille65 and City of Cannel-ByThe-Sea v. Young' for examples of what would constitute a compelling
state interest. In both cases, the compelling state interest concerned the
public's right to know about any conflict of interest between a public
official's employment and his or her private financial interests.' Another
example of a compelling government interest found in Cannel is "the need
60. Id. "In the field of health care, disclosure of information about a patient constitutes
'improper use' when it will subvert a public interest favoring communication of confidential
information by violating the patient's reasonable expectations of privacy." Id. One person's
right to privacy may threaten another's freedom of expression. However, freedom of expression
restrictions are tolerated when a compelling state interest provides justification. White v. Davis,
533 P.2d 222, 224 (Cal. 1975).
61. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
62. Article I, section 1 (as reworded by constitutional amendment in November 1974) now
reads: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
63. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).

64. Id. at 224.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 234.
67. Id.
68. 522 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1974).
69. 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970).
70. County of Nevada, 522 P.2d at 1350. Carmel, 466 P.2d at 226-27. "Obviously the
elimination and prevention of conflict of interest is a proper state purpose..." Carmel, 466
P.2d at 232.
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to preserve the efficiency and integrity of the public service."71
B. Scope of the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy
The California Supreme Court in White looked to the state's election
brochure for guidance in determining the scope of the amendment.' The
election brochure identified a need for restraints on the information activities
of government and business and noted the principal "mischiefs" at which the
amendment was directed. 3 One of these "mischiefs" was the "improper
use of information properly obtained."74
Relying on the Supreme Court decision in White, it is likely any state or
business action which "improperly uses information properly obtained" could
be held in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy. But how did
the courts extend this action from government and business to private
individuals?
The Urbaniakcourt relied on Porten v. University of San Francisco,7
one of the first cases to announce a broad scope to the constitutional right to
privacy. Porten complained that the University violated his right to
Without permission, the University of San Francisco had
privacy.'
disclosed grades Porten earned at Columbia University to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission.' The First District Court of Appeal found
The court noted
Porten had a right to privacy in his grade transcripts'
"[pirivacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an
inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone. " 79
After Porten, the appellate courts continued to broaden the scope of the
constitutional right to privacy. Using article I, section 1, the courts have

71. Cannel, 466 P.2d at 232.
72. White, 533 P.2d at 234. "California decisions have long recognized the propriety of
resorting to such election brochure arguments as an aid in construing legislative measures and
constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to a vote of the people." Id. at 234 n. 11.
73. Id. at 234.
74. Id. at 234. The election brochure listed these principal mischiefs: "(1) 'government
snooping' and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad collection and
retention of unnecessary personal information by government and business interests; (3) the
improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of
it for another purpose or the disclosure to some third party; and (4) the lack of a reasonable
check on the accuracy of [an] existing record." Id.
75. 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Ct. App. 1976).
76. Id. at 840.
77. Id.
78. Id.at 843.
79. Id. at 842. "There isno question that privacy was meant to be enforced, indeed
enforced even against private actors, and California courts are unanimous intreating itso."
Jennifer Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply
Against PrivateActors?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 124 (1989).
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protected the privacy of women seeking abortions,'o a hospital patient's records,"' and disclosures to a psychotherapist.'
The Urbaniak court
justified extending the right to privacy protection to HIV status by considering HIV status to be a "private fact," the disclosure of which may "be
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities."'
Porten held the constitutional right of privacy can be violated by any
private individual" suggesting that a violation could occur in a wide variety
of social contexts. This broad scope is exactly what the Urbaniak court
attempted to avoid by narrowly construing section 199.21.
Instead, the
court extended the constitutional right to privacy action to cover HIV status
while denying Urbaniak a remedy under section 199.21. Without the
protection of section 199.21, the concern becomes whether the right to
privacy action is sufficient to fully protect HIV-positive individuals while still
encouraging disclosure for safety purposes.

80. Chico Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Ct. App. 1989).

"The state right of privacy protects information about a citizen's participation in a medical
[rocedure, including abortion." Id. at 199. The Chico court found that patients of a women's
ealth cnter in a small town had no reasonable expectation of anonymity on the public sidewalk
in front of the clinic and declined to order an injunction to stop picketers. Id. at 200. However,
it did protect the women's privacy by upholding with modifications the trial court's injunctive
orders. Defendants were enjoined from "identiying (except from prior personal knowledge) or

disclosing the identity of any person approaching, entering, or leaving the... Center..." Id.

at 205.
81. Div. of Medical Quality, Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 55 (Ct. App. 1979). Here, Gherardini and the Mt. Helix hospital refused to surrender five
patients' records to the Medical Board investigating gross negligence of the patients' doctor.
Id. at 57. "The state of a person's gastrointestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from
unauthorized public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the contents of
his library or his membership in the NAACP." Id. at 61. The court required the Board to show
probable cause for invasion of patient privacy and a compelling state interest before disclosure
would be compelled. Id. at 62.
82. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Ct. App. 1986). The issue in Cutter was
whether a psychotherapist is immune from liability for a disclosure of privileged information
voluntarily made in a judicial proceeding, when the disclosure violates the patient's right of
privacy. Id. at 547. "We recognize the close analogy between a physician-patient and a
psychotherapist-patient relationship, and conclude that Brownbridge's impressions and diagnosis,
and other details of his professional relationship with Cutter fall with the zone of privacy
protected by the state Constitution." Id. at 549.
83. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 360. "The condition is ordinarily associated either with
sexual preference or intravenous drug uses .... In the field of constitutional law, federal
decisions concerning the right of privacy accorded to sexual practices, and California precedents
dealing with the privacy attaching to medical records and the psychotherapist-patient relationship,
provide judicial recognition of privacy interests in closely related areas of life." Id. See Doe
v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990). The Federal District Court found
a right of privacy in HIV status which was disclosed by a police officer. Id.at 385.
84. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
85. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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III. DOES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
PRIVACY PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION?

A constitutional right to privacy action based on "improper use of
information properly obtained" requires unauthorized overt disclosure of

private information where the party seeking relief had a reasonable expecta8 6
tion of privacy which is not outweighed by a compelling public interest.

However, the protection afforded by the constitutional right to privacy based
on "improper use of information properly obtained" is uncertain. There are

several reasons for concern. First, the standard defining "improper use of
information properly obtained" is unclear. Second, the degree of overt
disclosure required is questionable. Third, the right applies only when the
party seeking to protect the information has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Fourth, the protection is not absolute since the constitutional right
of privacy is not absolute; it can be outweighed by a "strong" or "compelling" countervailing public interest.
A. Improper Use of Information Properly Obtained
The Urbaniakcourt described the concept of "improper use of information properly obtained" as amorphous.' Amorphous has been defined as
"having no definite form" or "being without definite character or nature:
unclassifiable."88

The election brochure for the 1972 privacy amendment described
"improper use" as the use of information for another purpose or the
disclosure of it to some third party.' Subsequently, the courts have applied
the concept of "improper use of information properly obtained" to overly
broad dissemination of arrest data,'o to the posting of a personnel action
memorandum in a public place,91 to disclosure of an academic record
without permission,' and to a psychotherapist's disclosure of confidential
communications of a patient.'o
The First District Court of Appeal in Central Valley Chapterof the 7th
Step Foundation v. Younger "' found the California Department of Justice

86. Id. at 358-60.
87. Id. at 359. "[A] cause of action under article 1, section 1, may be based on a more
extensive, if still somewhat amorphous, concept of improper use of information properly
obtained." Id.
88. WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 38 (1977).

89. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
90. Central Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Found., Inc. v. Younger, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496,
505 (Ct. App. 1989).
91. Payton v. City of Santa Clam, 183 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (Ct. App. 1982).
92. Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976).
93. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (Ct. App. 1986).
94. 262 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
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had a compelling interest in maintaining arrest records containing nonconviction data.95 Although the nonconviction information was properly
obtained and used for law enforcement purposes, it was improperly used for
public employment considerations since it did not further law enforcement
or criminal justice.'
The Central Valley court found the use of the
nonconviction arrest information was improper because
it did not further the
7
original purpose for maintaining the information.
Similarly, the First District in Payton v. City of Santa Clara98 found
improper use when an interoffice memorandum stating reasons for an
employee's dismissal was posted on a bulletin board in a public employee
workroom.' The memorandum was addressed to the dismissed employee
alone and was posted by another employee acting within the scope of his
employment. 1" Although the memorandum may have been written for a
proper city purpose, the disclosure was not related to that purpose. 1 '
As discussed above, the First District in Portenfound improper use of
information properly obtained when the University of San Francisco
disclosed Porten's Columbia University grades to the State Scholarship and
Loan Commission."° This disclosure was made without Porten's consent
or the request of the Commission."' However, as the court pointed out,
if the Commission had requested the information, Porten might not have a
cause of action °"
The First District in Cutter v. Brownbridge found a psychotherapist's
unauthorized disclosure to Cutter's wife's attorney regarding details of
Cutter's therapy sufficient to sustain a constitutional right to privacy
action. 05 The attorney attached the therapy information to a court petition
requesting suspension of the patient's child visitation rights. 6 This
information could then become public knowledge as part of a court's judicial
proceedings. 0 7
The First District has found "improper use of information properly
obtained" when the use did not "further" the original purpose for maintaining the information, when the use was not "related" to the original purpose,
and when it was "disclosed without consent" to a third party. These three

95. Id. at 505.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 183 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1982).
99. Id. at 17.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 18.
102. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
103. Id. at 840.
104. Id. at 843.
105. Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
106. Id. at 547.
107. Id.
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factors appear to be the controlling ones in such cases.
Urbaniakapplied the concept of "improper use of information properly
obtained" to redisclosure of HIV status originally disclosed to warn a health
care worker to take safety precautions. 108 However, the courts have not
provided limitations for "improper use of information properly obtained."
As noted in Urbaniak, the concept is amorphous." ° The cases could be
interpreted as holding that an unauthorized disclosure related to the use for
which the information was gathered is proper."'0 Under this analysis, a
health care provider who performs a third party medical examination could
legally reveal a subject's HIV status without consent if the status was relevant
to the examination."' Without well defined limitations it is unclear when
disclosure of HIV status will be considered improper use of the information.
B. Overt Disclosure
In a footnote, the Urbaniak court indicated that "some kind of overt
disclosure" is required to sustain a constitutional right to privacy action."'
The court admitted it found no clear general standard for resolving the issue
of what is sufficiently overt.' 13 Dr. Newton disclosed Urbaniak's HIV
status in a report to Parente which ultimately resulted in disclosure to a least
seven individuals. 1 4
The First District has consistently found that full public disclosure is not
required for a right to privacy action. The Central Valley court found the
dissemination of nonconviction arrest records to authorized public employers
and licensing agencies was sufficiently overt to violate an arrestee's right to
privacy. 1 5 Here, dissemination was not to the general public, but resulted
in disclosure to various agencies and their employees.
The Payton court found the posting of an interoffice memorandum in an
employee workroom sufficiently overt." 6 Here, the workroom was visited

108. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 360 (Ct. App. 1991).
109. Id. at 359.
110. CMA Petition, supra note 56, at 11.
111. Id. Urbaniak's examination was a third party examination. The physician was retained
by the defense. Generally, "there is no confidential physician-patient relationship in a medical
examination of a plaintiff arranged for the benefit of the defense." Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr.
at 357.
112. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 359 n.4. "While article 1, section 1, does not require
'public disclosure,' some kind of overt disclosure is inherent in the concept of invasion of
privacy." Id.
113. Id. "The question remains whether a disclosure is sufficiently overt to violate a
constitutionally protected interest in privacy. Whatever may be the general standard for
resolving this issue, we note that decisions under article 1, section 1, indicate that a disclosure
for purpose of litigation may give rise to a cause of action under article 1, section 1." Id.
114. Id. at 356.
115. Central Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Foundation v. Younger, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499
(Ct. App. 1989).
116. Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183 Cal. Rptr. 17, 17 (Ct. App. 1989).
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daily by forty to fifty public employees.117
The Porten court found disclosure to the public was not required to
sustain a right to privacy action.'
A prima facie case was met by
unauthorized disclosure of Porton's grade transcript to the State Scholarship
and Loan Commission.1 9
The Cuttercourt found unauthorized disclosure of patient information to
one party, Cutter's wife's attorney, violated Cutter's right to privacy.'2
This disclosure was sufficiently overt since the attorney attached the patient
21
information to a court petition which could become public knowledge.
In those cases where the standard "improper use of information properly
obtained" has been applied, disclosure to a third party organization, to a
number of employees, or even to only one person has been held sufficient to
satisfy the overt requirement. However, all these cases involved actual or
threatened disclosure to more than a few individuals. The question of the
lower limit for overt disclosure remains. Under what circumstances, if any,
would communication to only one person, without possible dissemination to
others, constitute overt disclosure?
C. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
"In the field of health care, disclosure of information about a patient
constitutes 'improper use' when it will subvert a public interest favoring
communication of confidential information by violating the patient's reasonable expectations of privacy." " The significance of reasonable expectations "lies in the public interest in encouraging confidential communications
within a proper professional framework."" z The Urbaniak court reasoned
that enforcing the patient's reasonable expectations of privacy would
encourage both open communication and protection of the professional
relationship from abuse."
The Urbaniak court found, based upon the particular circumstances,
z
Urbaniak had reasonably anticipated privacy. "
The test applied was

117. Id.
118. Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1976).
119. Id.
120. Cutter v. Brownbridge, 228 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549 (1986).
121. Id. at 547.
122. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
123. Id. at 360.
124. Id. at 361.
125. Id. The court appeared to agree with the defendant that "while an examining physician
[in a discovery proceeding] might indeed incur liability by disclosing confidential information
irrelevant to the purpose of the examination, such liability cannot be predicated on invasion of
privacy in the absence of special circumstances indicating that the information was given in a
confidential communication between patient and physician." Id. at 357. "The asserted right of
privacy here must be premised on the peculiar circumstances of Urbaniak's disclosures to Dr.
Newton's nurse." Id. Here, Urbaniak had requested confidentiality prior to alerting the nurse
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whether Urbaniak "exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy which is
objectively reasonable." 1" The inquiry is equivalent to the reasonable
expectations test found in Federal Fourth Amendment cases. 127 The
question there is "[w]hether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy' . .. [and whether] ... society
[is] prepared to recognize [it] as reasonable.""
The court found Urbaniak exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
when he requested confidentiality from Newton's nurse." This expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable since patients ordinarily expect
that personal matters will remain with their physician." °
The application of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard can
vary significantly depending on the particular circumstances of a case.
Scholars have questioned the reasonable expectation formula, as applied in
California privacy cases, suggesting that it can lead to arbitrary results.'31
The Urbaniakcourt noted "the test of reasonable expectations can sometimes
be circular: expectations will be reasonable where privacy is recognized."132 This standard does not adequately identify the circumstances
under which a patient can assume his or her subjective desire for privacy will
actually receive legal protection. 33 The California Medical Association,
in its petition to decertify Urbaniak,pointed out the court's decision appeared
to allow a physician performing a third party examination to reveal a
patient's HIV status, without consent, if that status was relevant to the

to take safety precautions. Id.
126. Id. at 358.
127. Id. at 360. "State and federal decisions stemming from Katz v. United States have
established that the basic test as to whether there has been an unconstitutional invasion ofprivacy
is whether the person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy which is objectively
reasonable. . ." Id. at 358 (citation omitted). "Whether or not it should be so regarded, the
reasonable expectations test of these Fourth Amendment precedents may be read as at least
establishing a criterion, relevant to certain categories of cases, for recognizing a right to privacy
protected under the California Constitution." Id.
128. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). See Kevin E. Maldonado, California
v. Greenwood: A Proposed Compromise to the Exploitation of the Objective Expectation of
Privacy, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 647, 657 (1990). The U.S. Supreme Court found that Greenwood
had a subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage but that an objective expectation of privacy
was not accepted by society. Id. at 647-48.
129. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
130. Id. at 360.
131. See Maldonado, supra note 128, at 664. Maldonado suggests this dual test "allows the
courts to shape the interpretations of privacy expectations to fit their policy objectives." Id. See
also Robert Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 2-3,
8 (1971); Gerstein, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development of the
Protection of PrivateLife, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1982). "What is finally obvious is
that the reasonable expectation formula is indetenninate enough to allow for the consideration
of a whole range of factors, which are frequently dealt with in an arbitrary or at least subjective
manner. Consideration of societal attitudes and 'shared experience' as the basis for decisionmaling can lead to very casual reasoning." Id. at 397-398.
132. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 361 n.5.
133. CMA Petition, supra note 56, at 11.
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examination."3 However, if a patient during a third party examination
discloses his or her status for infection control purposes it is unclear what
constitutional protection the courts will provide.'35 Without clear protection, the public policy favoring disclosure of HIV status for infection control
is in significant jeopardy.
D. The Right to Privacy Can Be Outweighed
A Californian's right to privacy can be outweighed by a compelling state
interest." The California courts have used both a compelling interest test
and a balancing of interests test to determine when a right to privacy can be
outweighed.
The California Supreme Court used the compelling interest test to
determine whether information gathered by undercover agents in university
classrooms violated students' right to privacy. 37 The court was concerned
that the information collected was "largely unnecessary for any legitimate,
The First Appellate
let alone 'compelling' governmental interest."'
District used the compelling interest test and suggested a university could
contest a student's right to privacy action by showing some compelling1public
39
interest justifying the unauthorized transmittal of his grade transcript.
In another instance, the First District recognized a compelling state
interest in ascertaining the truth in judicial proceedings."' The court found
a patient's statements to his or her psychotherapist are protected by the
constitutional right to privacy, but an infringement of that right may be
allowed when the need for disclosure outweighs the patient's interest in
privacy. 4 Here, the court used the balancing of interests test instead of
the compelling interest test. 42 The court found, even when information is
directly relevant to litigation, "discovery will not be permitted until a
balancing of the compelling need for discovery against the fundamental right
of privacy determines that disclosure is appropriate. 1' 4 3 The court recognized both tests and noted they could not "readily determine" whether the

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. White, 533 P.2d at 234. "[The amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion
into individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling
interest." Id. "[A]lthough a patient has a constitutionally protected interest in information
contained in his or her medical file, disclosure may be appropriate in narrowly limited
circumstances to serve a compelling interest." Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
137. White, 533 P.2d at 234.
138. Id.
139. Porten, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 843-844.
140. Cutter, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
141. Id. at 550.
142. Id. n.7.
143. Id. at 549.
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two tests would produce equivalent results. 1
Because of the potential differences between the two tests, the HIVpositive individual is in a precarious position when depending on constitutional protection. He or she cannot be certain when a compelling interest
will outweigh his or her right to privacy. A statute can provide that
certainty.
Section 199.20 explicitly protects a person from being compelled in a
legal proceeding to identify an HIV-positive individual. 45 The statue also
clearly identifies exceptions where disclosure is permitted."x The legislature has provided clear protection for an individual's HIV status which can
not be overridden by a compelling interest. However, the Urbaniak court
held this legislation will apply only to those who have direct access to HIV
blood test results. With this narrow application of section 199.21 and the
uncertain constitutional protection, it is unclear when an individual's right to
privacy in his or her HIV status can be overridden.
E. Additional Inadequacies of a ConstitutionalRemedy
The Urbaniak decision suggests every unauthorized disclosure of HIV
status would violate a patient's right to privacy since a patient generally has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the traditional physician-patient
relationship. 47 This overly broad application of the right to privacy seems
comprehensive but it remains inadequate.
As discussed above, the right to privacy does not fully protect HIV status
and it does not address the public interest in disclosure for safety purposes.
An infected person is unlikely to disclose his or her HIV status to a health
care provider without clear protection. 48 Additionally, the Urbaniak
decision contradicts the Legislature's intent in section 199.24 to allow
144. Id. at 550 n.7. "We utilize the balancing of interests test in the present case, because
we perceive that the intrusion (denial of the means to enforce the privacy right) is less onerous
than in cases involving invasions of privacy which impact on the free exercise of other constitutional rights in addition to the right of privacy." Id.
145. "No person shall be compelled in any state, county, city, or other local civil, criminal,
administrative, legislative, or other proceedings to identify or provide identifying characteristics
which would identify any individual who is the subject of a blood test to detect antibodies to the
probable causative agent of AIDS." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (Deering 1992).
146. Sections 199.21, 199.215, 199.24 and 199.25 provide disclosure exceptions. See §
199.21(h) (cadavers); § 199.215 (disclosure to health care providers); § 199.24 (disclosure to
subject's legal representative, provider of health care, agent or employee of the subject's
provider of heath care, and to a provider of heath care who procures, processes, distributes, or
uses a donated human body part); and § 199.25 (notification to endangered spouse, sexual
partner or person with whom subject shared needles).
147. CMA Petition, supra note 56, at 13. "Not every unauthorized disclosure of medical
information should be constitutionalized. By amending the constitution to add an explicit right
of privacy, the People cannot have intended to render meaningless all specific statutory schemes
governing the confidentiality of medical information. The constitutional amendment was
intended to expand, not supplant, then-existing statutory and common law protections for
invasion of privacy." Id.
148. Id. at 12.
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unauthorized disclosures under specific circumstances.149
Furthermore, resolution of a constitutional action is likely to take longer
in the courts than one based on a clearly defined statute. A plaintiff seeking
recovery might face a judgement-proof defendant, an extremely long wait for
trial, or problems finding legal representation." ° This is precious time that
an HIV-positive individual can not afford."
Urbaniak died while his appeal was pending." By the time his case
was remanded to the Superior Court, actual damages could not be proven,
since most evidence offered was considered hearsay. The action was dismissed." The hearsay problem might have been overcome if the attorney
had foreseen a problem with proving actual damages. However, even if
damages could have been proven, the timing was critical. Urbaniak needed
and deserved a remedy during his lifetime. A broad statute can provide clear
HIV confidentiality protection and facilitate a faster remedyT 4
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BROAD STATUTE

The Urbaniakcourt found section 199.21 does not cover an HIV-infected
person who disclosed his or her status to a health care worker in order to
warn the worker to take safety precautions.' 55 Given the court's interpretation of section 199.21 and the ambiguities inherent in a right to privacy
action, California should consider new legislation to provide clear protection
and to encourage disclosure. HIV-infected persons need clear and predictable protection in order to feel comfortable
disclosing their status in settings
56
where safeguards need to be taken.1

149. Id. at 11. Section 199.24 allows unauthorized disclosures to: (a) the subject of the HIV
test or the subject's legal representative; (b) a subject's provider of heath care; (c) an agent or
employee of the subject's provider of health care; and (d) a provider of health care who uses a
donated body part. § 199.24.
150. Glenney, supra note 16, at 1728. "The tort system cannot be relied on to ensure
confidentiality. A plaintiff seeking recovery faces many hurdles: a judgment-proof defendant,
an extremely long wait for trial, difficulty in securing legal representation, and proving damages,
to name a few. Moreover, an AIDS patient may not survive long enough to benefit from the
judgment."
151. The median incubation period between HIV infection and the onset of AIDS is nearly
10 years. Policy Briefs, supra note 6, at 31. However, "[t]hose who actually develop AIDS
usually die within eighteen months of diagnosis." Glenney, supra note 16, at 1705.
152. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
153. Telephone interview with Alice Philipson, Urbaniak's Trial Attorney (Sept. 29, 1992).
154. See supra note 150.
155. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 362. "The statutory language, in short, appears to apply
only to disclosures by persons having access to the record of the results of a blood test." Id.
156. CMA Petition, supra note 56, at 5. "Without an assurance that their identities as 'HIV
positives' will be kept confidential in the health care setting at-risk persons will be unwilling to
seek testing, counseling, and treatment from their personal physicians and to disclose their sexual
or needle-sharing partners to physicians for purposes of partner notification; HIV seropositive
persons will also be unwilling to disclose their infected status to health care providers for
purposes of treatment and infection control." Id.
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A. Arguments Against a Broader Statute
One argument against broad HIV confidentiality legislation is that if
confidentiality is based on a right to privacy, it does not matter whether the
information concerns HIV status or any other medical condition. 57 HIV
status is already protected by California's medical confidentiality laws. 5 '
However, there are reasons for specific HIV legislation. First, HIV-infected
individuals may be subjected to more stigma and discrimination than persons
with other disabilities.159 Second, there is legal precedent for laws which
address specific disabilities."
Another argument against broad legislation is that it is not needed to
cover disclosure to a health care provider. Under many circumstances, HIV
16
status is protected by the confidential physician-patient relationship. 1
However, as in Urbaniak, no physician-patient relationship is established
during an examination done for discovery purposes. 62 If California wants
to encourage disclosure of HIV status in order to warn a health care worker,
or others, to take safety precautions, then clearly defined legislation to
protect confidentiality is the answer. Other states have enacted broad HIV
confidentiality statutes. It is time for California to look to these states for
guidance.
B. Hawaii's Statute
Hawaii's Revised Statute section 325-101 is an example of legislation
which provides broad confidentiality protection for HIV status. 1"
In
essence, the statute protects all communication that identifies any individual

Id.

157. RENNERT, supra note 1, at 4. "Confidentiality is a matter of personal autonomy ....

"

A single confidentiality policy for all medical information would minimize confusion.

"Mhe more confusion, the greater the likelihood of breaching confidentiality."

1d.

158. Id. at 3. California Civil Code section 56.10 addresses confidentiality of medical
information. Section 56.10(a) prohibits disclosure of a patient's medical information without
authorization. Id. However, a court can compel disclosure. Id. § (1). California Health &
Safety Code section 199.20 specifically provides a court cannot compel disclosure of an
individual's HIV test results. Clearly, California has determined section 56. 10 does not provide

adequate confidentiality protection for HIV test results. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
199.20. Additionally, HIv-infected persons want assurances that their HIV status is protected
not only in health care settings, but residential programs, day care centers, and schools.
RENNERT, supra note 1, at 3-4.
159. RENNERT, supra note I, at 4.

160. Id.
161. Bruce A. McDonald, Ethical Problems for Physicians Raised by AIDS and HIV

Infection: Conflicting Legal Obligations of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 557, 571 (1989). "Duties under existing state law . . . are adequate to enforce the
patient's privacy rights without subjecting physicians to penalties under new state or federal

requirements." Id.
162. Urbaniak, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
163. HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101 (1992).
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who has HIV infection or AIDS. 1" It protects not only records of a blood
test, but the fact an individual is HIV-infected.'"
The statute also contains a list of exceptions, including release to
emergency medical personnel, the health department and sexual partners. 1"
It establishes a civil penalty for willful disclosure that raises from one
thousand to ten thousand dollars plus reasonable court costs and attorney's
fees to be paid to the injured party.'67
The Hawaii statute appears to protect voluntary disclosures of HIV status
to warn another to take safety precautions. This protection would cover
disclosures not to only medical personnel but also police, fire-fighters, and
even private individuals. This significant protection applies in a wide variety
of social situations.
C. New York's Statute
New York's Public Health Law section 2782 is another example of
fairly broad confidentiality legislation.168 The New York statute protects
HIV-related information in all health and social service settings. It also
covers HIV-related information obtained by authorized release.' The stat-

164. Id. Section (a) of the statute reads: "The records of any person that indicate that a
person has a human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, AIDS related complex (ARC), or
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), which are held or maintained by any state
agency, health care provider or facility, physician, laboratory, clinic, blood bank, third party
payor, or any other agency, individual, or organization in the state shall be strictly confidential.
For the purposes of this part, the term 'records' shall be broadly construed to include all
communication which identifies any individual who has HIV infection, ARC, or AIDS. This
information shall not be released or made public upon subpoena or any other method of
discovery." Id. at (a).
165. To be truly effective, the scope of confidentiality protection must extend beyond positive
HIV test results to the fact that a person is infected. "Without an assurance that their identities
as "HIV positives" will be kept confidential in the health care setting at-risk persons will be
unwilling... to disclose their infected status to health care providers for purposes of treatment
and infection control." CMA Petition, supra note 56, at 5.
166. HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-101. Section 325-101(a) exceptions include: (1) release to
the department of health; (2) release made by prior written consent; (3) release made to medical
personnel in an emergency to protect the health of the named party; (4) disclosure to inform the
sexual or needle sharing contact of an HIV-positive patient provided identity not disclosed; (5)
release of data for the control and treatment of infection provided identity not disclosed; (6)
release of a child's records to the department of human services and child protective services
primarily on a need to know basis; (7) release made to patient's health care insurer to obtain
reimbursement for services rendered; (8) release to another health care provider for the purpose
of continued treatment and (9) release made pursuant to a court order, after an in camera review
of the records, upon a showing of good cause by the party seeking the information. Id.
167. Id. § 325-102.
168. N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 2782 (McKinney 1992).
169. Id. § 2782(1). "[N]o person who obtains confidential HIV-related information in the
course of providing any health or social service or pursuant to a release of confidential HIVrelated information may disclose or be compelled to disclose such information. . ." Id.
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ute covers a number of exceptions similar to those in Hawaii's statute."
New York's HIV confidentiality legislation provides for civil and
criminal penalties. The civil penalty is up to five thousand dollars for
improper disclosure."' The criminal penalty makes it a misdemeanor to
willfully disclose HIV status without consent of the individual or under the
protection of one of the express exceptions." 7
The scope of the New York statute is not as broad as Hawaii's statute.
It does not extend to all agencies, services or private individuals. However,
it does appear to cover situations where an HIV-positive person discloses his
or her status to warn a health care worker to take safety precautions.
D. Pennsylvania'sStatute
On February 27, 1991, Pennsylvania's Confidentiality of HIV-Related
Information Act took effect."D The Act is similar to New York's and
protects almost all HIV-related information held by a health or social service
worker. 174 Coverage is broad and expected to include not only health and
social service workers but also schools, legal services, hotlines and job
programs. 75 The Act also lists a number of specific
exceptions similar to
1 76
those found in the New York and Hawaiian statutes.
Today, in Pennsylvania, anyone who freely discloses his or her HIV
status to a health or social service worker or discloses in writing will be
protected.'" The Act is enforced by private lawsuits with the plaintiff
entitled to compensatory damages and possibly attorney fees and court
Costs. 178

170. Id. Numerous exceptions are made including disclosure to specific heath care providers
and facilities, insurers, adoptive parents, foster parents, correctional institutions, third party
reimbursers for health care and disclosures authorized by court order. Id.
171. Id. § 2783(1)(b).
"Any person who shall disclose, or compel another person to
disclose, or procure the disclosure of, confidential HIV related information in violation of
section twenty-seven hundred eighty-two of this article; shall be subject to a civil penalty not to
exceed five thousand dollars for each occurrence." Id.
172. Id. § 2783(2).
173. PENNSYLVANIA MEDICAL SOCIETY, AIDS A MEDICAL-LEGAL HANDBOOK 19 (1991).
174. Id. at 26-27.
175. Id. at 27.
176. Id. HIV-related information may be released to the subject and to those designated by
the subject in a release form. Others who may receive the information without a specific written
release include health care workers treating the patient, organizations providing peer review for
health care workers, health care workers providing emergency services, insurers, government
health authorities, anyone found by a court to have a compelling need, funeral directors and
employees of juvenile justice providing residential placement. Id. at 27-28.
177. Id. at 27. "Anyone is free to release HIV-related information about himself/herself to
anyone he/she pleases in any way he/she likes. If the recipient is providing any health or social
service, or if the release comes in writing as specified in the Act, the recipient is bound by the
confidentiality rule of the Act." Id.
178. Id. at 31.
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E. Recommendations For California
The statutes of Hawaii, New York and Pennsylvania point out the
inadequate state of HIV confidentiality protection in California. The
California Legislature should consider expanding section 199.21 or enacting
new legislation to provide broader protection for HIV status. Broader
protection will encourage disclosure for safety purposes. The legislature
could look to the laws of Hawaii, New York or Pennsylvania as examples
which provide broader protection. Another option might be to codify the
California right to privacy in clear and predictable terms.
The Urbaniakcourt was concerned with providing protection in too wide
a range of social settings. The New York and Pennsylvania statutes provide
protection in health and social service settings without opening protection to
limitless situations. These statutes protect in situations where an individual
discloses his or her HIV status in order to warn a health care worker to take
safety precautions. California should enact similar confidentiality legislation
to provide protection for HIV-positive persons and their health care workers.
CONCLUSION

In seeking to provide protection for HIV status, the Urbaniak court
narrowly construed a potentially effective statute while providing for very
broad protection under the California constitution. This right to privacy
protection superficially appears to be adequate, but has problems in scope
and definition which can seriously impact the rights of HIV-positive
individuals.
First, the right to privacy action based on "improper use of information
properly obtained" is not well defined. It is not clear when use will be
considered improper. It appears that an unauthorized disclosure of HIV
status may be made if the purpose is related to the use for which the
information was gathered.
Second, the degree of disclosure necessary for a prima face case has not
been determined. Disclosure to one person could have serious impact on an
HIV-positive individual's life. Nonetheless, it is not clear that an unauthorized disclosure to only one person would be considered a violation.
Third, in order to be protected, the HIV-positive person must have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the courts use both subjective
and objective tests of reasonableness. The differences between the tests can
lead to arbitrary decisions.
Fourth, and perhaps the most pressing concern, is that the right to
privacy can be outweighed by a compelling public interest. Again, because
there are two different tests used by the courts, an HIV-positive individual
cannot be certain when his or her reasonable expectation of privacy will be
outweighed.
One public purpose for protecting the confidentiality of HIV-positive
individuals is to encourage them to enter treatment programs. There is also

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol29/iss2/6

22

McNamara: Protecting HIV Confidentiality After Urbaniak v. Newton: Will Cal

19931

HIV CONFIDENTIALITY

a compelling public interest in disclosure of HIV status for safety purposes.
If clear and predictable protection is not available, individuals are not likely
to disclose they are infected. They will not receive much needed treatment
and others will not be protected from infection.
The current state of HIV confidentiality protection in California is
inadequate. The California Legislature should consider expanding 199.21 or
enacting new legislation to provide broader protection for HIV status and to
encourage disclosure for safety purposes. With the increase in HIV
infection, the continued threat of discrimination, and the public's need for
disclosure for safety purposes, it is critical that the Legislature provide for
definitive HIV confidentiality protection.
Joan N. McNamara*

* This Note is dedicated to my husband, Joseph McNamara, and my son, John-Anthony
Giannetta. Thank you Joey for all your love, patience and support. Thank you Tony for giving
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their guidance and encouragement.
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